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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE 
ASSAULT AND BATTERY EXCEPTION TO THE STATE'S WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act expressly waives immunity 
"for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of [a 
governmental] employee" but makes an exception "if the injury 
arises out of . • . [an] assault [or] battery," among other things. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(b) (Supp. 1985). 
The trial court held that the plaintiff's allegation that a 
University of Utah employee "assaulted and struck" her came within 
the assault and battery exception to the statutory waiver of 
immunity and therefore granted the defendants' motion for judgment 
on the pleadings. 
In her opening brief, the plaintiff, Clare Wright, first 
argued that the assault and battery exception to the statutory 
waiver of immunity did not apply because her injuries did not 
"arise out of" an assault or battery but out of the University's 
negligent hiring and supervision of the employee who struck her. 
Wright agrees that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Ledfors v. 
Emerv County School District. 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993), 
effectively rejected this argument* ££. Doe v. Durtschi. 716 P.2d 
1238, 1243-45 (Idaho 1986) (contra). Nevertheless, the assault and 
battery exception does not apply for other reasons. 
1 
A. The Assault and Battery Exception Applies Only to Assaults and 
Batteries Committed in the Course of Governmental Activity, 
Wright also argued that, in keeping with the principle that 
exceptions to the Governmental Immunity Act's waiver of immunity 
should be narrowly construed, the terms "assault" and "battery" 
should be construed to refer only to assaults and batteries 
committed in the course of law enforcement or other core 
governmental activities and not, as in this case, an attack by a 
noneducational employee at a public university. The defendants 
gloss over this argument by saying that the legislature has 
declared that anything a governmental entity does is a 
"governmental function," see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (a) , so any 
assault or battery by a governmental entity or its employee by 
definition is an assault or battery in the course of a governmental 
activity. 
The legislature cannot constitutionally cloak every 
governmental entity with absolute immunity for everything it does— 
even those actions completely lacking any governmental 
justification—simply by defining everything a governmental entity 
does as a "governmental function." There are constitutional limits 
on the legislature's ability to extend governmental immunity to all 
actions of all governmental entities. See, e.g.f Hansen v. Salt 
Lake Countyf 794 P.2d 838, 845 (Utah 1990) (recognizing possible 
constitutional problems with the grant of absolute immunity for 
flood control activities); Condemarin v. University Hosp. , 775 P. 2d 
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348, 366 (Utah 1989) (holding unconstitutional the recovery limits 
of the Governmental Immunity Act as applied to the University 
Hospital).1 For example, the legislature could not open a public 
restaurant in competition with other restaurants and immunize it 
from all liability simply by adopting the syllogism the defendants 
suggest: Governments are immune from liability for the exercise of 
a governmental function; everything a government does (including 
running a restaurant) is a governmental function; therefore, 
governments are immune from liability for running a restaurant. 
But regardless of whether the legislature could 
constitutionally declare everything a governmental entity does a 
"governmental function,11 the issue here is not the definition of 
wgovernmental function* in section 63-30-2 but the definitions of 
••assault" and "battery" in section 63-30-10. The statutory 
definitions of "assault" and "battery" depend on what the 
legislature intended by the terms when it passed the Governmental 
Immunity Act in 1965,2 not what the legislature intended by the 
term "governmental function" when it amended the act in 1987. Cf. 
United States v. Neustadt. 366 U.S. 696, 707 (1961) (the law to be 
1
 The legislature apparently recognized the limitations on 
its authority to extend immunity to all conduct of a governmental 
entity when, in the wake of Condemarin, it amended section 63-30-3 
to define only certain operations of state-owned university 
hospitals as "governmental functions." See Utah Code Ann. S 
63-30-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1992). 
2
 The assault and battery exception to the waiver of immunity 
has not changed in substance since it was originally enacted. 
3 
applied in construing the assault and battery exception to the 
Federal Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity is the law according 
to "established tort definitions . . . in 1946 ,M when the FTCA was 
adopted). 
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the 
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit nor within the intention of 
its makers This is not the substitution of the 
will of the judge for that of the legislator; for 
frequently words of general meaning are used in a 
statute, words broad enough to include an act in 
question, and yet a consideration of the whole 
legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from 
giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it 
unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to 
include the particular act. . . . " . . . [T]he sages of 
the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary 
to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes 
which comprehend all things in the letter they have 
expounded to extend to but some things, . . . which 
expositions have always been founded upon the intent of 
the legislature, which they have collected sometimes by 
considering the cause and necessity of making the act, 
sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, 
and sometimes by foreign circumstances.11 
Rector of the Holv Trinity Church v. United States. 143 U.S. 457, 
459 (1892) (quoting Stradlina v. Morgan. Plow. 205). 
The Governmental Immunity Act as originally enacted provided 
for governmental immunity for the exercise of a governmental 
function but waived immunity, if there ever was any, for the 
exercise of nongovernmental functions. See Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-
3 (1977); Johnson v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 433 
(1981); Greenhalgh v. Payson Citv. 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975). 
In other words, the Act was meant to retain immunity only where 
- 4 -
government was acting as government; government could be liable for 
its actions when they were indistinguishable from those of a 
private person. See Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-3 & -4 (1977). 
After providing generally for immunity for the exercise of 
governmental functions, the Act then waived that immunity for 
negligent acts or omissions of governmental employees acting within 
the scope of their employment, with certain exceptions. See id. § 
63-30-10. 
This waiver of immunity would have been unnecessary if the 
negligent act of the governmental entity or its agent did not 
constitute the exercise of a governmental function in the first 
place, since the Act did not provide immunity for such acts. When 
the legislature then made an exception to its waiver of immunity 
for injuries arising out of an assault or battery, it must have had 
in mind only assaults and batteries occurring in the course of 
governmental functions, since only such actions were subject to the 
statutory waiver of immunity in the first place. C£. Sheridan v. 
United States. 487 U.S. 392, 400 (1988) (the assault and battery 
exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply to torts 
that fall outside the act's general waiver of immunity) (adopting 
the reasoning of Judge (later Justice) Harlan in Panella v. United 
States. 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954)). 
Consistent with the structure of the Governmental Immunity Act 
and its legislative history and intent, "assault11 and "battery11 in 
section 63-30-10 should be construed to refer to assaults committed 
• 5 -
in the course of law enforcement or other core governmental 
activities and not simply any assault committed by any government 
employee. See Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348, 350 
(Utah 1989) (each of section 63-30-10's exceptions to its waiver of 
immunity is "within the %core' of governmental functions'*). Cf. 
Ricca v. United States. 488 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(the assault and battery exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act 
is essentially an exception for claims based on failure to follow 
proper police procedure). 
B. There Was No Assault or Battery in This Case, 
In any event, the assault and battery exception to the Act's 
waiver of immunity does not apply here because there was no 
"assaultM or "battery." 
Assault and battery require intentional conduct. Lively v. 
City of Blackfoot, 416 P.2d 27, 31 (Idaho 1966); Stricklin v. 
Parsons Stockyard Co.. 388 P.2d 824, 829 (Kan. 1964). See also W. 
Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 9 at 
39 & S 10 at 46 (5th ed. 1984) (assault requires proof that the 
actor intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact or to arouse 
apprehension of such a contact) • Where there is no intent to cause 
harm, there is no assault or battery. See, e.g.. Bollaert v. 
Witter. 792 P.2d 465, 466 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Morgan v. Pistone. 
25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839, 839-40 (1970) (where the defendant 
touched the plaintiff flsimply to call attention by way of 
explanation that he,f did not like the plaintiff's insults, there 
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was not necessarily "that kind of intentional touching amounting to 
a technical battery"). The facts# viewed in the light most 
favorable to Wright
 # show that the employee who struck her was 
autistic and was in a trance at the time he struck her. One can 
infer from this that he lacked the intent to harm Wright or cause 
her apprehension. Thus, there was no assault or battery. 
The defendants argue, however, that, when it comes to tort 
liability, a mentally ill person is judged by an objective 
standard. Because a mentally ill person can still be liable for 
his torts, the defendants claim, the assault exception applies. 
The defendants' argument is a nonsequitur. The issue here is not 
whether the employee who struck Wright can be civilly liable for 
the damage he caused but whether Wright's injuries arise out of an 
••assault" and "battery" within the meaning of section 63-30-
10(1)(b). If the employee lacked the requisite intent to commit an 
assault, Wright's injuries do not "arisef] out of" an assault or 
battery, regardless of whether the employee may nevertheless be 
liable civilly for the harm he caused. 
As the defendants note, the cases holding mentally ill people 
liable for their attacks on others generally rest, not on a 
traditional tort analysis (that is, on the grounds that the 
defendant's actions meet all the elements of a claim for assault or 
battery) but on grounds of public policy. The principal policy 
underlying those decisions is that, where one of two innocent 
persons must suffer a loss, the loss should fall on the one who 
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caused it rather than the other, who had no role in producing it 
and could not have avoided it. That policy supports Wright's claim 
in this case. Wright did not cause her loss and could not have 
avoided it. The University caused her loss (or at least made it 
likely to occur) by hiring an autistic person with a known 
propensity for violence and placing him in a position where he was 
likely to come in contact with students. As between Wright and the 
University, the University should bear the loss. By giving the 
terms "assault11 and "battery" their ordinary meanings, the court 
can see that the University bears the loss caused by its employee's 
actions. 
A second policy underlying the decisions holding mentally ill 
people liable for their acts is that such a result will encourage 
the custodians of the mentally ill to restrain them from injuring 
others. Like a custodian, the University, as the employer of the 
person who assaulted the plaintiff, had a duty to see that the 
employee's actions did not harm others. If the University is 
immunized from liability for its breach of that duty, it will have 
no incentive to exercise more care in the future when it hires and 
supervises the mentally ill. Thus, public policy actually favors 
a finding of liability in this case.3 
3
 A third policy underlying the liability of mentally ill 
people is the difficulty of determining mental deficiency and a 
hesitancy to introduce into the civil law the confusion surrounding 
proof of insanity in criminal cases. However, these concerns do 
not justify denying recovery in a proper case. The threshold 
question in a case such this is whether or not there was an assault 
- 8 -
If the employee lacked the requisite intent to commit an 
assault or battery, by definition there was no assault or battery# 
and the assault and battery exception to the waiver of immunity 
does not apply.4 S§& Moffjtt yt United gfrafreg, 430 F. Supp. 34, 
37-38 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
C. Tfre Plaintiff#P gpmplaint Poes $o% Fequjre a Pifferept 
Conclusion-
The defendants suggest, however# that because Wright alleged 
that she was "assaulted?and struck" by a University employee, she 
was somehow bound by her characterization of the attack and the 
trial court was therefore justified in dismissing her claim.5 
or battery. That issue would be the same whether the plaintiff 
sued her assailant directly or sued his employer. Triers of fact 
are quite capable of determining issues of intent and determining 
whether or not the actor had the requisite intent for an 
intentional tort. See, e.g., Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 475 
P.2d 839, 839-40 (1970) (jury did not err in finding that there was 
not an intentional touching amounting to a battery). If the actor 
had the requisite intent, he may have committed an assault or 
battery, but if he did not, there is no tort, and hence the 
intentional tort exception does not apply. If this is a question 
of making "hairsplitting distinction[s],w as the defendants claim, 
as the defendants also recognize, it is a distinction that courts, 
juries and even dogs are quite capable of making and in fact make 
every day. 
4
 In that case, the University's liability would be analogous 
to that of a person who assumes control over a vicious animal or an 
explosive device. See Sheridan v. United States. 487 U.S. 392, 403 
(1988). 
5
 The defendants further argue that the trial court committed 
no error in not allowing Wright to amend her complaint to allege an 
unintentional striking because Wright had ample time to amend and 
did not do so. Wright did not amend her complaint because she did 
not think any amendment was necessary. The trial court could only 
grant the defendants' motion if Wright would not have been entitled 
to relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support 
- 9 
Wright's use of the word "assaulted" is not conclusive. In 
determining the applicability of the assault and battery exception 
to the waiver of immunity, "a court must look, not to the theory 
upon which the plaintiff elects to proceed, but rather to the 
substance of the claim which he asserts." Lambertson v. United 
States, 528 F.2d 441, 443 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 921 
(1976). Wright's complaint alleges that she was "assaulted and 
struck." R. at 3 I 4 (emphasis added). While one could infer from 
the word "assaulted" that the employee who hit Wright had the 
requisite intent for an assault, the word "struck" does not 
necessarily connote a battery. A striking can be either 
intentional or unintentional. An intentional striking is a 
battery, but an unintentional striking is not. See, e.g., Moffitt, 
430 F. Supp. at 37-38. Not all assaults include batteries, and 
vice versa. See Baca v. VelezP 833 P.2d 1194, 1196 (N.M. Ct. 
App.), cert, denied. 835 P.2d 80 (N.M. 1992). "One may exist 
without the other." W. Page Keeton, et al., supraf § 10 at 46. 
of her claim. See, e.g.. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.f 795 P.2d 
622, 624 (Utah 1990). Wright offered one set of facts that would 
have entitled her to relief—an unintentional striking by a person 
in an autistic trance. The burden was therefore on the defendants 
to show that the employee who struck Wright acted with the 
requisite mental state for commission of an assault or battery. 
See Ricca v. United States. 488 F. Supp. 1317f 1324-25 (E.D.N.Y. 
1980) . See also Moff itt. 430 F. Supp. at 38 (where the plaintiffs 
contended in their brief that there was a question of fact 
concerning the government employee's mental condition, that factual 
issue had to be resolved before the court could determine whether 
the assault exception applied). The defendants have never even 
tried to meet that burden. 
• 10 
Wright did not allege that the employee committed an assault and 
battery. She alleged that the employee assaulted and struck her. 
Wright's injuries arose from having been struck, not assaulted. 
Wright's allegation that she was •,struck[]w by the University 
employee was broad enough to cover an unintentional striking for 
which the assault and battery exception of section 63-30-10(1)(b) 
would not apply. £f. Ricca. 488 F. Supp. at 1321, 1323-24 (where 
the plaintiff claimed that the defendants "assaulted, harassed, 
aimed at and shot11 her, the government was entitled to summary 
judgment on her specific cause of action for assault and battery 
but not on her negligence claim, since the assault and battery 
could have been unintentional). 
Because there was at least one state of facts under which the 
plaintiff would have been entitled to relief against the defendants 
despite the assault and battery exception to the Governmental 
Immunity Act's waiver of immunity—namely, an unintentional 
striking by a University employee acting within the scope of his 
employment—the defendants were not entitled to judgment on the 
pleadings, and the trial court erred in granting their motion. 
II. 
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The plaintiff has argued that, if the Governmental Immunity 
Act bars her claims, the Act is unconstitutional. 
11 -
The defendants argue, for the first time on appeal, that the 
Governmental Immunity Act did not unconstitutionally deprive the 
plaintiff of any remedy against the state because the state was 
absolutely immune from tort liability at common law, regardless of 
whether the activity in question was characterized as "proprietary" 
or a "governmental function." 
In fact, in determining whether the state or its related 
entities enjoy governmental immunity in a given case, Utah courts 
have considered whether or not the activities involved were 
governmental functions. See, e.g.. Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co,, 
842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) (Utah Department of Transportation); 
Gillman v. Department of Fin. Inst. . 782 P.2d 506, 512 (Utah 1989) 
(state and department of financial institutions); Condemarin v. 
University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348, 349-50 & 372 (Utah 1989) (per 
Durham & Stewart, JJ.) (University Hospital); Little v. Utah State 
Div. of Family Servs.. 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983) (state division 
of family services); White v. State. 579 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Utah 
1978) (state industrial commission); Sheffield v. Turner. 21 Utah 
2d 314, 445 P.2d 367, 368 (1968) (state and state prison warden); 
Campbell Blda. Co. v. State Road Comm'n, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857, 
860 (1937) (road commission); Kirk v. State. 784 P.2d 1255, 1256 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (state and department of corrections). See 
also Johnson v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist.. 20 Utah 
2d 389, 438 P.2d 706, 707 (1968) ("This court consistently, since 
statehood, has noted the distinction" between governmental and 
- 12 -
proprietary functions); Cobia v. Rov Citv, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 
986, 988 (1961) (MOur court consistently has held [state] agencies 
. . • immune from tort liability where such agency has acted in a 
governmental capacity rather than in a proprietary one"). 
Moreover, Utah cases have recognized that the immunity of the state 
and its subdivisions derives from the fact that the functions the 
state generally performs are governmental, not proprietary, in 
nature. See, e.g., Hurst v. Highway Dep't, 16 Utah 2d 153, 
397 P.2d 71, 73 (1964) ;.' Bingham v. Board of Educ, 118 Utah 582, 
223 P.2d 432, 436-38 (1950). 
The great weight of authority from other jurisdictions has 
also recognized the distinction between proprietary and 
governmental functions in determining the liability of states and 
their subdivisions and has not reserved the distinction only for 
municipal corporations. See Annotation, State's Immunity from Tort 
Liability as Dependent on Governmental or Proprietary Nature of 
Function. 40 A.L.R.2d 927 S 2 (1955), and cases cited therein. 
In any event, the argument is properly directed to the Utah 
Supreme Court. In Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989), that court held that the Governmental Immunity Act's 
limitation on damage awards was unconstitutional as applied to an 
injured party's claim against the University Hospital because it 
deprived the plaintiff of a right she would have had at common law, 
namely, the right to sue an agency of the state (the university 
hospital) for negligence in the performance of nongovernmental 
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functions. Thus, a majority of the court apparently thought the 
state could be sued at common law if it was performing a 
nongovernmental function. See 775 P.2d at 349-52 (Durham, J.) & 
371-72 (Stewart, J.).6 The defendants have not tried to 
distinguish Condemarin: they have only argued that it was wrongly 
decided. But until the Utah Supreme Court overrules Condemarin, it 
is still good law and is dispositive of the defendants' argument 
that Wright has not been deprived of any right in violation of the 
open courts provision because the state was absolutely immune from 
tort liability at common law and the proprietary-governmental 
function distinction does not apply to the state. 
The defendants further argue that, even if the state was only 
immune from liability at common law when it was exercising a 
governmental function, higher education is such a function. All 
the cases the defendants have cited in support of this argument are 
inapposite because they involved the liability of public high 
schools or junior high schools, not a public university, as in this 
6
 The third justice in the majority, Justice Zimmerman, 
tacitly agreed that individuals could sue the state at common law 
for injuries arising out of the performance of nongovernmental 
functions. Although he did not specifically address the scope of 
the state's immunity at common law, he agreed that the Governmental 
Immunity Act impinged on important substantive rights protected by 
article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. See 775 P.2d at 
367-68. If the state were absolutely immune from liability at 
common law, as the defendants claim, it would not violate the open 
courts provision to limit a plaintiff's remedy against the state. 
See Madsen v. BorthicR, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983). 
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case.7 The state does not require people to attend universities, 
as it does elementary and secondary schools. ££. Hamburger v. 
Cprn?U VTUversity, 172 N.Y.S. 5, 6 (N.Y. AP P. Div. 1918) (a 
university does not discharge a governmental function), aff'd, 123 
N.E. 868 (N.Y. 1919). 
More important, cases applying the governmental-proprietary 
distinction to schools have looked at the particular activity 
giving rise to the claim to determine whether or not the conduct 
was governmental in nature and hence whether immunity applies. 
£g£, e.g.. Meyerhoffer v. East Hanover Township Sch. Dist.. 280 F. 
Supp. 81, 83-84 (M.D. Pa. 1968); Sawaya v. Tucson High Sch. Dist. 
No. 1. 281 P.2d 105, 108 (Ariz. 1955); Brown v. Wichita State Univ. 
f"Brown I") . 540 P.2d 66, 87-88 (Kan. 1975), modified, 547 P.2d 
1015 ("Brown II*) (Kan.), appeal dismissed. 429 U.S. 806 (1976);8 
7
 One of the cases the defendants rely on for their argument 
that higher education is a governmental function is Bingham v. 
Board of Education. 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (Utah 1950). The 
plaintiff in Bingham was injured when she fell into burning embers 
from a school incinerator. The state has also relied on Bingham 
for its argument that the governmental-proprietary function 
distinction does not apply to the state and its agencies. In 
another appeal the state has argued that, because the school 
board's operation of an incinerator to burn books and other debris 
was clearly a proprietary and not a governmental function, if the 
distinction applied to the state, then the school board would have 
been held liable in Bingham. Brief of Intervener State of Utah at 
4-5, Hipwell v. Sharp (Utah) (No. 920218). As the state candidly 
recognized in that case, not everything a school board (or 
university) does is a governmental function. 
8
 Brown I held that Kansas's governmental immunity statute, 
which gave the state absolute immunity but made other governmental 
entities immune only for the performance of governmental functions, 
violated equal protection, due process and the state constitution's 
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Carroll v. Kittle, 457 P.2d 21, 28 (Kan. 1969); Allen v. Salina 
Broadcasting. Inc.. 630 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). The 
mere identity of the defendant as a public school or university is 
not dispositive. See Brown I. 540 P.2d at 88 (the liability of a 
governmental entity ••will depend upon the particular activity with 
due consideration given to the totality of all relevant factors"). 
As the defendants recognize,9 there is no evidence of record 
to show how the employee who struck the plaintiff was engaged at 
the time of the incident. Thus, the trial court could not say, 
based solely on the pleadings, that the employee was engaged in the 
performance of a governmental function at the time. There was at 
least one state of facts under which the plaintiff would have been 
entitled to relief—namely, if the University employee was not 
engaged in the performance of a governmental function. Where, as 
here, there is a genuine issue of fact as to the specific activity 
giving rise to the plaintiff's claim, the defendants are not 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Allen, 630 S.W.2d 
at 228 (where there was a material issue of fact as to whether a 
school district was engaged in a proprietary or governmental 
open courts provision. On rehearing, the court reversed its 
conclusion on the constitutional issue and vacated that part of its 
decision. See Brown IIf 547 P.2d at 1019. 
9
 See Brief of Appellees at 27. 
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function when it allegedly defamed the plaintiff# the district was 
not entitled to summary judgment). 
Even if the Governmental Immunity Act did not deprive Wright 
of a right she would have had at common law to sue the state, the 
1978 amendment to section 63-30-4 of the Act, which extended 
immunity to government employees, deprived Wright of a right she 
clearly would have had at common law to sue her assailant. The Act 
did not provide an effective and reasonable alternative remedy to 
a civil action against the government employee who caused her 
injury, nor was the abrogation of individual liability justified as 
a reasonable means of eliminating a clear social or economic evil. 
Thus, the Act violates the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution, article I, section 11. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985). 
The defendants argue, however, that the plaintiff's open 
courts challenge fails because she failed to establish that she has 
no remedy for her injuries against the employee who struck her. 
Section 63-30-4(3) of the Governmental Immunity Act expressly 
extends the immunity accorded governmental entities to their 
employees unless the employee acted through fraud or malice. The 
defendants argue that Judge Lewis did not err in rejecting the 
plaintiff's open courts challenge because "there is at least the 
possibility that Wright can prove that the employee acted with 
malice.11 Brief of Appellees at 28. By the same token, there is 
wat least the possibility" that the employee did not act with 
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malice, in which case he would be immune from liability. In fact, 
if the employee could not form the intent required for an assault 
or battery, as Wright claims, a fortiori he did not act with 
malice. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court 
was required to consider this latter possibility.10 
Because the defendants were entitled to judgment on the 
pleadings only if there was no state of facts under which Wright 
would be entitled to relief and, by the defendants' own reasoning, 
there was at least one state of facts under which Wright would have 
been deprived of a remedy against her assailant, in violation of 
the open courts provision, the trial court erred in granting the 
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
Finally, the defendants argue that, because Wright has not 
proved that she has been deprived of any right protected by the 
open courts clause, a presumption of constitutionality applies, and 
the challenged provisions easily meet the minimum scrutiny required 
under the due process and equal protection clauses. 
For the reasons stated above, Wright has been deprived of 
rights protected by the open courts provision of the Utah 
10
 The defendants also suggest that the plaintiff might also 
have a remedy against the state under the Crime Victim's 
Reparations Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-63-1 through -24. However, 
reparation awards may be made only for "criminally injurious 
conduct,11 Utah Code Ann. § 63-63-11(9) (a), which the act defines as 
conduct that would be punishable under the criminal code, id.. 
§ 63-63-2(6)(a). If the mental state of the employee who struck 
the plaintiff precluded him from intending his actions or their 
consequences, he would not be subject to punishment under the Utah 
Criminal Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-101 & -305(1). 
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Constitution, article I, section ll.11 Thus, the burden was on 
the defendants to show that the Governmental Immunity Act was 
constitutional. The defendants have not even tried to meet that 
burden. But if the burden were on Wright to prove the Act 
unconstitutional, she has met her burden. 
The heightened scrutiny Condemarin applied to the recovery 
limits provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act was not based 
solely on the deprivation of a common law right in violation of the 
open courts provision. As Justice Durham noted, deference to the 
legislature is ,finappropriate when dealing with the fundamental 
principle of American law that victims of wrongful or negligent 
acts should be compensated to the extent that they have been 
harmed.H Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 354. See also id. at 360 ("the 
right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive 
rightw). Under the Utah Supreme Court's equal protection analysis, 
the strictness of the court's scrutiny varies with the nature of 
the right or interest discriminated against. See id. at 372 (per 
Stewart, J.) (citing Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n.17 (Utah 
1984)). See also Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp, . 
752 P.2d 884, 889 (Utah 1988) (wto pass state constitutional 
muster, a legislative measure must often meet a higher de facto 
standard of reasonableness than would be imposed by the federal 
11
 At a minimum, Wright's complaint raises genuine factual 
issues as to whether Wright has been deprived of such rights, 
making judgment on the pleadings inappropriate. 
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courts"). And under the court's wmore straightforward11 due process 
analysis, the court looks at the reasonableness of legislative 
action in relation to legitimate legislative ends. See Condemarin. 
775 P.2d at 356-57 (per Durham, J.). Given the importance of the 
rights involved in this case, a higher standard of review is 
required whether the court analyzes the Governmental Immunity Act 
under due process or equal protection, and under any but the most 
deferential scrutiny, the Act fails. 
By arbitrarily depriving certain classes of injured people of 
any right to recovery—such as victims of governmental as opposed 
to nongovernmental torts, victims of the state as opposed to 
victims of other governmental entities, students of public as 
opposed to private universities, victims of governmental assaults 
as opposed to governmental negligence, and those injured in their 
persons as opposed to those injured in their property12—the 
Governmental Immunity Act violates the equal protection guaranty of 
the Utah Constitution: 
The doctrine [of governmental immunity] and the 
exceptions thereto, operate in such an illogical manner 
as to result in serious inequality. Liability is the 
rule for negligent or tortious conduct, immunity is the 
exception. But when the tortfeasor is a governmental 
agency, immunized from liability, the injured person must 
forego his right to redress unless within a specific 
12
 As applied by the trial court, the Governmental Immunity 
Act affords greater protection to property than to people—the 
source of the state's power—since the state cannot take private 
property for public use without paying just compensation, see Utah 
Const, art. I, § 22, yet it can intentionally ruin a person's 
health and even take her life with impunity. 
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exception. Equality is not achieved by artificial 
exceptions which indiscriminately grant some injured 
persons recourse in the courts and arbitrarily deny such 
relief to others. The operative effect of such arbitrary 
distinctions are incompatible with the constitutional 
safeguards [of equal protection] . . . . 
Brown I, 540 P.2d at 81-82 (citations omitted). 
The Governmental Immunity Act# as interpreted by the 
defendants and the trial court, also violates due process. It 
deprives the plaintiff of any redress for her injuries. The 
defendants offer no justification for this limitation on an injured 
person's rights and well—being, and the traditional justifications 
offered for governmental immunity simply do not hold water. 
The rationale most often given for governmental immunity is 
the need to protect the public treasury. See, e.g., Brown II, 547 
P.2d at 1027. MThe error of this rationale lies in the speculation 
from which it is borne.11 Brown 1 . 540 P.2d at 83. The Utah 
Supreme Court has already concluded that this rationale is 
insufficient to deprive an injured person of any remedy for her 
injuries, especially where, as here, the state has offered no 
evidence to suggest that the public treasury is in any danger. See 
Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 363 (Durham, J.), 369 (Zimmerman, J.) & 
373-74 (Stewart, J.). gee also Brown II, 547 P.2d at 1037-38 
(Fatzer, C.J., dissenting); Brown I. 540 P.2d at 83; John W. Creer, 
Note, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: An Analysis. 1967 Utah 
L. Rev. 120, 122 & n.13; and authorities cited therein (the 
experience of those jurisdictions that have abrogated governmental 
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immunity dispels the myth that the removal of immunity will lead to 
the state's financial ruin). 
A second rationale sometimes offered for governmental immunity 
is that immunity is necessary to allow government to function 
unhampered by the threat of legal action. Of course, this 
rationale loses its force where the legal claim does not arise out 
of the performance of a governmental function. Moreover, the 
possibility of spurious lawsuits does not justify the denial of 
meritorious claims: 
To say that government needs to be able to operate 
unhampered by the threat of legal actions intimates that 
the state should not be bothered by the fact it has 
injured people because it has more important things to 
do. 
M
. . . A government of *of, by and for 
the people' derives its strength from being 
just and reasonable and not irresponsible in 
its dealings with the people. . . . *To 
submit, in justification of the rule, that the 
immunity is necessary for the proper 
functioning of [government], is to propound 
the obvious contradiction that the agency 
formed to protect society is under no 
obligation, when active itself, to protect an 
individual member of society.#M [Blades, & 
Comment on Governmental Tort Immunity in 
Kansas. 16 Kan. L. Rev. 265, 267-68 (1968)]. 
To say that the threat of legal actions will 
intolerably hamper government activities is to say that 
government alone, among all our institutions, cannot 
properly function if it shoulders responsibility for its 
actions. 
Brown II. 547 P.2d at 1038 (Fatzer, C.J., dissenting). As Abraham 
Lincoln said, "It is as much the duty of government to render 
proper justice against itself, in favor of its citizens, as to 
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administer the same between private individuals ." Quoted in Sawava 
v. Tucson High Sch. Dist. No, 1, 281 P.2d 105, 107 (Ariz. 1955). 
In short, to the extent the Governmental Immunity Act deprives 
Wright of any remedy for her injuries, either from her assailant or 
from the university that negligently hired and failed to supervise 
him, the Act violates the open courts, equal protection and due 
process guaranties of the Utah Constitution.13 
CONCLUSION 
"A fundamental concept of our system of laws is that one may 
seek redress for every substantial wrong.w Brown II. 547 P.2d at 
1043 (Fatzer, C.J., dissenting). The trial court's ruling, 
granting the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
deprived Wright of any opportunity she might otherwise have had to 
obtain redress for her injuries. For the reasons set out in 
Wright's opening brief and in this reply brief, the judgment of the 
district court should be reversed. 
13
 It is bad enough that Wright is denied any recovery from 
the defendants: "To maintain a system of laws whereby we are 
individually liable but collectively immune is more than 
irrational, it is immoral.w Brown II. 547 P.2d at 1043 (Fatzer, 
C.J., dissenting). But, under section 63-30-4, she is also 
deprived of any remedy against the government employee who 
inflicted her injuries. 
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